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In this paper, we present the preliminary results of an experiment conducted to observe the 
impact of the different training techniques to increase the likelihood of participants identifying 
and reporting phishing messages. Three different training approaches were used – general 
video/quiz training, just-in-time training with simulated phishing emails, and a leaderboard, 
which awarded users points for forwarding correct phishing messages and penalized them for 
incorrect ones. The experiment emulated a normal working day of an executive assistant of a 
manager in an organization. Each participant was expected to accomplish work tasks and 
respond to work-related emails while watching for and reporting phishing messages. We 
observed that both general training and the presence of a leaderboard decreased the propensity to 
click on a phishing message, while we found no effect for different types of just-in-time training.  
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INTRODUCTION 
It’s a nightmare scenario; your customers’ personal and credit card information is put on 
illicit websites for sale. Such was the case with Target when its customers found their credit and 
debit card information was now for sale on the Dark Web (Winter 2014). The cause of this 
breach was an old but pernicious attack: phishing. Phishing is a socially engineered attack aimed 
at fraudulently acquiring sensitive information from a victim. A single weak link in an 
organization opens the way for the attackers to cause damages like identity theft, loss of 
intellectual property, financial loss, and denial of access (Hong 2012). The problem of phishing 
is now worse than ever. According to a recent Federal Bureau of Investigation report (McCabe 
2016), there has been a 270% increase in successful phishing attacks since 2015. This is the 
highest increase in activity since phishing attacks have been measured. The danger these attacks 
pose and the increase in prevalence, call for improved strategies to combat phishing attacks 
which are more personalized and sophisticated now. As a first step towards mitigating these 
attacks, individuals and organizations need to train users on how to identify phishing messages 
that get past the automatic detection systems. Although most sophisticated organizations offer 
phishing training of some sort, there is no clear research that points to the exact efficacy of 
different types of phishing training in organizations. In this research, we study the impact of 
different types training that have been designed to help users detect and report phishing attacks. 
This research-in-progress paper outlines the preliminary findings of three different types 
of training in an experiment. These are: 1) general video/quiz training, 2) mock phishing training 
with just-in-time training (JIT), and 3) a phishing leaderboard, which evaluates the correctness of 
reported phishing emails by an individual. Preliminary results of the training indicate that both 
the general training and the leaderboard decreased the likelihood of clicking on a message, but 
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just-in-time training did not. This paper unfolds first by briefly describing the theoretical 
development and hypotheses.  This is followed by a description of our methods. Finally, we 
provide preliminary results and discuss these results.    
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
In the current research, we aim to measure the impact of different types of training on the 
accuracy of the phishing reports (general phishing training, JIT training, and leaderboard). All of 
these interventions are aimed at improving an individual’s awareness and intention to report the 
messages. Specifically, reporting an email as phishing/legitimate is a binary classification task 
measured by the accuracy of detection. The two measurements of interest are – true positives and 
false positives. Past research (Jensen et al. 2011) suggests two aspects of importance in training 
programs aimed at improving an individual’s detection abilities. First is to set proper thresholds 
of known characteristics used for identification like inclusion of suspicious link and cues to 
indicate urgency. Second is to carefully add new diagnostic characteristics to broaden the 
detection like adding a request for private information. Phishing training can improve the 
thresholds and diagnostic characteristics individuals use to identify phishing messages. 
Wright and colleagues (Wright and Marett 2010; Wright et al. 2014; Durcikova et al. 
2015; Wright et al. 2016) have noted the benefits of training in reducing the phishing 
vulnerability in individuals. But when they are left alone, such passive training has been 
observed to have limitations in helping them identify phishing attacks (e.g., Wright and Marett 
2010). However, there has been a dearth of literature on the efficacy of this training techniques in 
comparison with other techniques. We expect general training to improve the identification 
ability of an individual. Thus: 
H1a: General training on what is a phishing message will decrease the likelihood of 
clicking on a phishing messages. 
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H1b: General training on what is a phishing message will increase likelihood of a user 
correctly reporting a phishing message.  
   
Just in time (JIT) uses mock phishing messages sent to employees to provide active 
training (Duffy and Jonassen 1992). Researchers have illustrated the power of learning-by-doing 
through improved productivity gains as the learners gain experience and accumulate needed 
knowledge (Epple 1991). JIT is typically seen in organizations that execute mock phishing 
attacks on their own subjects. Companies like Phishme.com, Phishing Labs, and PhishTank offer 
services that create campaigns to launch against employees in an organization (Phishme 2013). 
Initial tests of JIT have shown promise in reducing susceptibility to phishing attacks, but it is 
unclear what type of JIT training is most effective (e.g., Kumaraguru et al. 2007). We compare 
two versions of JIT training. The lean JIT just informs the participant that it was a phishing 
message whereas the rich JIT provides a detailed training on identifying such a phishing 
message. Thus: 
H2a: Rich Just-in-Time training will decrease the likelihood of clicking on a phishing 
messages more than lean Just-in-Time training. 
  
H2b: Rich Just-in-Time training will increase the likelihood of a user reporting a 
phishing message over lean Just-in-Time training.  
   
Leaderboards used for phishing is drawn from the concept of gamification (Deterding 
2011). It involves creating systems that rewards participants with badges or points for correct 
reporting of phishing messages. While it is known to be motivational and enjoyable in education 
and employee training (Landers et al. 2011; Glover 2013), this type of extrinsic motivation is 
also observed to encourage knowledge sharing in general (Hung et al. 2011) and is here applied 
to sharing knowledge about possible phishing messages. Thus: 
H3a: The presence of a leaderboard will decrease the likelihood of clicking on a phishing 
messages. 
Karumbaiah et al./ Phishing Training:  A Preliminary Look at the Effects of Different Types of Training 
 
Proceedings of the 11th Pre-ICIS Workshop on Information Security and Privacy, Dublin, Ireland December 10, 2016.  5 
 
 
H3b: The presence of a leaderboard will increase likelihood of a user reporting a 
phishing message.    
METHOD 
A 2 (general training: presence/absence) X 2 (JIT: rich/lean) X 2 (leaderboard: 
presence/absence) factorial experiment was conducted with 422 undergraduate students at a large 
Northeastern university in the USA. For those in the general training condition, we introduced 
participants to a high-quality video describing how to identify phishing messages and follow-up 
quiz that reinforced the phishing training. This type of training is deployed by most organizations 
(Puhakainen and Siponen 2010). The quiz asked subjects about phishing and provided the correct 
answers to reinforce the video’s message. This video and subsequent quiz was given 10 days 
before the experiment session.  
JIT follows a learning-by-doing approach in a context representative of the real world. 
We had mock phishing messages sent to the participants while at task. For the two flavors of the 
second condition, we varied the amount of information the participants would get in the training. 
The rich JIT condition includes a link in the phishing message, which directs participants to a 
webpage and demonstrates a 3-step procedure that could have helped identify the message as 
phishing (similar to the video training). The lean JIT condition directed participants to a simple 
webpage that just informed them that they clicked on a phishing link. 
For the third treatment, we developed a phishing leaderboard that tracks when 
participants identify phishing messages correctly. For the groups with leaderboard, a score is 
maintained based on if they report the message as phishing. An algorithm was written to score 
the forwarded messages. Participants, identified by their userID, received +100 points for correct 
reports and -25 points for wrong reports. A web portal with real time listing of participant names 
and scores in descending order by score is projected at the front of the lab.  
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A group of 30 participants was randomly assigned to a session and was supervised by 2-3 
lab assistants. Each session was provided with the same experimental task. There were a total of 
17 sessions in this experiment. Ten days before their scheduled session, the participants were 
asked to fill a pre survey and were given (or not given) the general training. After the training, a 
survey captured propensity to trust, perceived internet risk, and self-reported identification 
abilities (Wright and Marett 2010).  
In each session, participants were briefly introduced to the task and the leaderboard (if 
present in the condition). The task was designed to simulate a typical day in a knowledge 
workers job that included certain tasks and organizational priorities. The participants took the 
role of an executive assistant to the vice president (VP) of a tech company and were expected to 
manage the VPs email, forward personal messages, schedule appointments, and accomplish 
search tasks (e.g., a location for a large company meeting). They were detailed on email 
etiquette, priorities and constraints, along with the evaluation metrics for their tasks in the order 
of importance. Further, all students were provided a document that outlined the organization’s 
Information Technology (IT) security policy, which included asking subjects to forward all 
possible phishing emails to an address similar to phishing@company.com. Eight messages were 
prepopulated in their inboxes the previous night and the remaining 18 messages came during the 
experiment session.  
Five of the 26 total messages were phishing messages and imitated real phishing 
messages like IT service alert, a cloud storage share request, a deal from a hotel chain, a payment 
receipt and a security alert. The link in these phishing messages redirected them to either the rich 
JIT webpage or the lean JIT webpage designed by us. After 30 minutes of working on the task, 
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the participants were directed to a post-survey. After the experiment, the browser log of the 
participant’s machine was collected to identify the phishing webpages visited by the participant. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 Our preliminary results show a number of interesting findings. First, it is important to 
note that it was necessary to separate testing of the hypotheses training into two models because 
all the participants for the general training and the leaderboard training experienced (or not) the 
intervention regardless of their actions in the experiment. In the JIT condition, participants only 
experienced training if they clicked on a phishing message. To test the efficacy of JIT training, 
we ran a binary logistic regression with subjects that clicked on at least one phishing message 
(i.e., received the JIT training). We found that those subjects in the rich JIT condition did not 
click on significantly fewer messages than those in the lean JIT condition (p = 0.516). In other 
words, the likelihood that a subject clicked on another phishing message after either the rich or 
lean JIT training is statistically similar. Further, we found no difference in the number of correct 
phishing messages that were reported by the subject for either the rich or lean JIT (e.g., 
forwarded these messages; p = .985).      
In the next model, we executed a multivariate regression that included both the general 
training and the leaderboard training as fixed factors and propensity to trust, internet risk, 
experience with phishing, and sex as covariates. The dependent variables (DV) were 1) number 
of phishing messages clicked, and 2) number of messages reported as phishing (e.g., forwarded 
to the reporting account). All of the covariates in this model (trust, risk, sex) were not 
significantly related to the DVs at p > .10. Phishing experience was significantly related to the 
number of phishing messages the user clicked p = .08. Both the leaderboard and the general 
trainings were significantly related to how many phishing messages subjects clicked (p = 0.02, p 
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< 0.01, respectively). The interaction of the leaderboard and video/quiz was also significantly 
related to the number of phishing emails that subjects clicked on. There was no significant 
relationship between the fixed factors and the covariates to how many phishing messages were 
reported. Examining the means of the number of phishing messages clicked in each condition, 
we see that the general training reduced the number of messages click by 42% and the 
leaderboard reduced the amount of phishing messaged clicked by 41%.  
Table 1. Mean Scores for # of Phishing Messages Clicked.  
Training Mean # of Phishing Messages Clicked 
(Presence / Absence) 
Standard Error  
(Presence / Absence) 
Pre-Training Video 0.57 / 0.99 0.10 / 0.09 
Just-in-Time Training* 2.01/ 1.94 1.25 / 1.24 
Leaderboard 0.58 / 0.98 0.09 / 0.10 
Note: * The means of those who experienced JIT training (e.g., fell for at least one phishing 
message) 
In our preliminary analysis of the data from this experiment we found that only the general 
training (H1a) and the leaderboard (H3a) induced significant differences in the number of 
phishing emails clicked on by the participants. Further, there is no evidence that JIT training 
(H2a) reduced the likelihood to click on a phishing message. Finally, there is no evidence that 
any of these trainings increase the propensity to report phishing messages.   
Currently, we have several other factors that are being investigated in this data set. First, 
we are currently coding the response quality of the task that was given to the subjects. We will 
then use a regression model to analyze how the different interventions impacted work related 
observations such as coded quality of task, the number of messages sent, the number of non-
phishing messages that were reported as phishing, etc. We have also collected data on stress 
related constructs which we will use as covariates in this model. They include computer anxiety, 
technology paralysis, perceived disruption of task, and perceived threat. Also, we are currently 
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collecting data in a field experiment where we will examine the efficacy of training in the field 
using the participants’ own organizational email accounts. Finally, we did find an interaction 
between the general training and the leaderboard. We need to explore these interactions further. 
The full results of the laboratory experiment and the field experiment will be reported in the 
presentation.  
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